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Corporate governance research in the context of emerging economies has received increasing 
attention in recent years (Al-Malkawi, Pillai & Bhatti, 2014; Allen, 2005; Berglöf & Claessens, 
2006; Black, Gledson de Carvalho, Khanna, Kim & Yurtoglu, 2014; Claessens & Fan, 2002; 
Claessens & Yortuglu, 2013; Crittenden & Crittenden, 2012; Fan, Wei & Xu, 2011). 
Academics and practitioners are becoming aware that the nature of governance problems and 
the firm-level governance mechanisms at work in different countries are embedded in their 
own national business system and influenced by political, social and legal macro-institutions 
(e.g., Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & Jackson, 2008; Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima, 2013; 
Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). More specifically, governance problems in developed economies 
tend to have their roots in dispersed ownership, small managerial shareholdings, prevalence of 
standalone companies, and market-based transactions. However, emerging economies are 
characterized by concentrated ownership, pyramidal ownership structures, dominance of 
business groups, and high levels of related-party transactions. As a consequence, principal-
principal conflicts are a major concern of corporate governance in developing countries (Young, 
Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang, 2008). In addition, emerging markets are often subject to 
weaker formal institutions and different informal institutions; and these country-level 
institutions tend to have important implications on corporate governance arrangements and 
their effectiveness (Hou, Kuo & Lee, 2014; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013 and 2016).  
 To carry forward the success of the special issue on “Asian Corporate Governance” (Li 
& Nair, 2009) and to further advance understanding of the relevant issues, the University of 
Edinburgh Business School hosted a special issue conference on “Challenges in Corporate 
Governance in Emerging Economies” in conjunction with Corporate Governance: An 
International Review on 4-5 December 2015 in Edinburgh, UK. The keynote speech of the 
conference was contributed by David Yermack from NYU Stern School of Business. He 
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discussed the corporate governance implications of blockchain technology for emerging 
countries in terms of improved liquidity and transparency, reduced costs in trading and voting, 
and reduced needs for auditing and litigation. The conference and the special issue attracted 
about 70 submissions by scholars from various disciplines and from around the globe. Twelve 
papers were selected for presentation in the conference. All papers were subjected to the 
standard refereeing and editorial process of Corporate Governance: An International Review. 
In this article, we introduce peculiarities of corporate governance in emerging economies and 
survey the four articles that were eventually accepted for inclusion in the special issue. 
 
Peculiarities of Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies 
Different Governance Environments 
The differences in the nature and the extent of governance problems that we observe between 
developed and emerging economies imply that firm-level governance solutions that aim to 
minimize the costs of governance-related efficiency losses are also different (e.g., Zattoni & 
Judge, 2012). Typically, governance solutions constitute an optimal mix of internal and 
external mechanisms (e.g., Walsh & Seward, 1990) with the weights differing between 
developed and emerging economies. Whereas “bundles” of governance mechanisms in 
developed economies rely more on board monitoring, executive compensation and the market 
for corporate control, in the relationship-based systems in emerging economies, a greater 
emphasis is placed on the governance role of lending institutions, large blockholders including 
family shareholders, and organizational governance hierarchies. In large emerging economies 
such as China, India and Russia, there is moreover significant involvement of state agencies in 
running businesses even when some of their shares are publicly listed on the stock exchanges 




Governance developments in both established and emerging economies also indicate 
that changes in the economic environment, as well as changes in cultural, political and legal 
institutions, have a profound impact on the evolution of firm-level governance mechanisms as 
well as their effectiveness. In general, every country’s national governance system is path-
dependent (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). An important implication of such path-dependency, 
particularly in the context of emerging economies, is that, while regulators and corporate 
governance activists promote the adoption of international best practices, the differences in 
formal and informal institutions interact with firm-level governance developments to provide 
a basis for multi-dimensional, multi-level corporate governance systems that incorporate the 
evolution of their country-specific institutions. 
Research Perspectives 
In recent years, a considerable literature has begun to emerge that has challenged the objective 
of modern corporations itself. Specifically, this literature asks whether governance systems of 
modern corporations should be focused on maximizing financial returns for the shareholders 
and stakeholders (including customers, suppliers, employees, community) or should also cover 
the objectives of society at large, including protecting the environment (Freeman, Wicks & 
Parmar, 2004; Jones & Felps, 2013; Mitchell, Weaver, Agle, Bailey & Carlson, 2016). Falling 
under the rubric of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), and popularly referred to as the 
‘environmental, social and governance’ (ESG) framework, this view signifies a whole gamut 
of corporate behaviour, ranging from falling moral standards and ethical practices in business 
to improving the quality of life of the workforce, protecting human rights, promoting gender 
diversity, caring for the environment, and meeting broader developmental goals such as 
alleviation of poverty and inequality (e.g., Campbell, 2007; Carroll, 1999; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001). Notwithstanding the concern by some that CSR might distort managerial 
incentives due to the presence of multiple objectives and exacerbate governance problems (e.g., 
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Jensen, 2002), there is a growing assertion that socially responsible management that balances 
the legitimate stakes of internal and external constituencies (Talaulicar, 2010) can lead to 
higher financial return. This argument makes moot the trade-offs between shareholder 
objectives and social responsibility and suggests that growth that is sustainable in the long run 
may be achievable, although the underlying mechanisms driving this relationship may be more 
complex (Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi & Saaeidi, 2015; Wang & Choi, 2013; Zhao & Murrell, 
2016). CSR has become an important topic in countries across the world but has gained special 
emphasis in emerging economies because of the complementary role corporations can play in 
overall development processes to provide collective goods (e.g., Boddewyn & Doh, 2011) and 
to build institutions (Marquis & Raynard, 2015). The adoption of CSR practices whose 
effectiveness may also rest on institutional conditions (e.g., Halkos & Skouloudis, 2016) may 
therefore signal to investors the superior capabilities of firms that can be utilized to fill 
institutional voids common in developing countries (Su, Peng, Tan & Cheung, 2016; 
Jayasinghe, 2016).  
The nature of the governance problem and the solutions that are characteristic of 
emerging economies, outlined above, have implications for empirical research. First, given the 
dominance of inside ownership and controlling shareholders, the study of ownership structure 
and its evolution remains an important area of research with respect to emerging economies as 
the effects of various ownership structures, and their interactions with the institutional 
environment, tend to differ across countries (Aguilera, Talaulicar, Chung, Jimenez & Goel, 
2015). Extant literature suggests that concentrated ownership emerges due to effort by owners 
to protect their capital in the presence of weak legal and financial institutions (Boubakri, Cosset 
& Guedhami, 2005; Cuomo, Zattoni & Valentini, 2013; Gomes, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). This in turn has effects on the market for corporate control and 
economic efficiency (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002). As new institutions develop and 
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existing institutions strengthen, one ought to observe dynamic changes in ownership holdings 
of corporations in emerging economies, leading to higher activity in the market for corporate 
control and consequent increases in firm performance.  
Second, given the prevalence of business groups and pyramidal structures, and the 
presence of controlling owners in key management positions, related-party transactions will 
continue to remain an interesting area of research in the context of emerging market economies. 
One strand of literature tends to suggest that related-party transactions may lead to economic 
efficiency due to vertical integration and missing capital markets, particularly within business 
groups that may provide coinsurance against difficulties or distress faced by member firms 
(Gordon, Henry & Palia, 2004; Jia, Shi & Wang, 2013; McCahery & Vermeulen, 2005). The 
contrasting view is that related-party transactions with group companies could be ways of 
tunnelling resources from companies with low ownership rights to high ownership rights, while 
related-party transactions with controlling shareholders could be ways of serving the interests 
of majority inside shareholders at the expense of outside minority shareholders (Aslan & 
Kumar, 2014; Bertrand, Mehta & Mulainathan, 2002; Boateng & Huang, 2017; Healy & 
Whalen, 1999; Kang, Lee, Lee & Park, 2014). Empirical research in this area ought to 
distinguish between the different types and forms of related-party transactions, detect 
expropriating behaviour, and suggest ways of mitigating them.  
Third, with respect to solutions of governance problems, the role played by the board 
of directors (Abdullah, Ismail & Nachum, 2016), the audit committee (Khan, Muttakin & 
Siddiqui, 2013) and the outside auditor (Fan & Wong, 2005) remain a focus of empirical 
investigation for emerging economies. An important issue in this respect is ways of ensuring 
the “independence” of the outside directors, members of the audit committee and the external 
auditor, in the presence of controlling insiders who have a decisive say in director and auditor 
appointments. Consequently, governance arrangements developed for established economies 
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may turn out to be less effective in emerging market environments (Chen, Li & Shapiro, 2011). 
In this respect, the role and composition of the nomination committee require more attention 
than has been accorded in the existing literature. Relatedly, board and committee behaviour 
and engagement in strategic issues deserve more attention compared to structure and 
composition (Judge & Talaulicar, 2017). Another important issue for achieving good 
governance in emerging economies is the quality of enforcement (e.g., Dharmapala & Khanna, 
2013). A large body of work has documented that while the laws in the book in many emerging 
economies are comparable to those in many developed economies; the law on the ground is 
considerably weaker and is plagued by lower quality of implementation, detection and 
deterrence (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; Coffee, 2007; Klapper & Love, 2004). In this 
connection, the role and effectiveness of both public enforcement through legal institutions as 
well as private enforcement through institutional activism and investor awareness (Berglöf & 
Claessens, 2006; Chung & Talaulicar, 2010; Jackson & Roe, 2006) constitute important areas 
of research in emerging economies. 
Fourth, the concept of “governance bundles” (e.g., Schiehll, Ahmadjian & Filatotchev, 
2014) as solutions to governance problems imply that empirical work on measurement of 
governance effectiveness must incorporate a combination of governance mechanisms, internal 
and external, rather than concentrate on any particular mechanism (Bosse, 2009; García-Castro, 
Aguilera & Ariño, 2013; Millar, 2014). Put differently, the measurement of effectiveness of 
any particular governance mechanism must take into account the juxtaposition of other 
complementary and substitute mechanisms without which one risks the problem of incomplete 
specifications and omitted-variable bias in empirical analysis (cf. Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). 
A promising development in this area of research is the evolution of the concept of a corporate 
governance index (e.g., Al-Malkawi, Pillai & Bhatti, 2014; Black, Gledson de Carvalho & 
Sampaio, 2014; Prommin, Jumreornvong, Jiraporn & Tong, 2016). Notwithstanding the 
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challenges inherent in the creation of an aggregative measure (Black, Love & Rachinsky, 2006), 
the concept of a corporate governance index may provide an intuitive way of measuring the 
efficacy of various governance arrangements, where the same governance score can be 
achieved through a combination of internal and external governance mechanisms. 
Fifth, extrapolating the concept of an optimal governance bundle from the viewpoint of 
the corporation to that of the nation at large, there is the interesting question of whether the 
path-dependent national governance systems that one observes in different countries across the 
world are equally efficient in terms of reaching the same governance outcomes, or whether 
some governance structures are inherently more efficient, with institutional rigidities and path-
dependency preventing some national governance systems from reaching an efficient structure 
(cf. Yoshikawa, Zhu & Wang, 2014). This is the question of formal convergence versus 
functional convergence (Gilson, 2001) and requires a comparative study of the relative 
performance of corporations across national boundaries (e.g., Khanna, Kogan & Palepu, 2006), 
and of the evolution of legal, financial and political institutions.  
Finally, the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) will emerge as an important 
area of research in corporate governance in the coming years. CSR is still not well understood 
in developing countries, and deserves more scholarly attention (Wang, Tong, Takeuchi & 
George, 2016). There is heightened discourse in this area, with most countries making reporting 
of CSR expenditure mandatory for all listed firms, and with India and China going even further: 
India by enacting legislation to make CSR expenditure (of two per cent of net profits) 
mandatory for all listed companies (based on a mechanism of comply-or-explain) and China 
by requiring state-owned listed companies to undertake CSR expenditure as a part of their 
contract with the state. Empirical research in this area ought to investigate and comment on 
whether CSR indeed leads to an increase in social capital, with resultant increases in company 
valuation and long-run sustainable growth of corporations, or reduces firm value due to 
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diversion of funds from core activities. This research will also benefit from incorporating the 
institutional environment in which corporate governance and CSR activities are embedded and 
unfold their effects (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). 
Methodological Considerations 
Empirical research on corporate governance challenges in emerging economies may also 
benefit from more rigorous implantation of methodological approaches to ensure better 
construct validity of data, and to better address causality and potential issues of endogeneity 
that may be particularly important in the case of emerging economies (Black, Gledson de 
Carvalho, Khanna, Kim & Yurtoglu, 2014). 
There has been increasing attention to identification strategies in corporate governance 
research, for establishing credible casual inference. Major approaches typically include 
propensity score matching (PSM), fixed effects, difference-in-differences, event study, 
instrumental variables, the Heckman selection model, and regression discontinuity. Shipman, 
Swanquist and Whited (2017) indicate that studies often overstate the capabilities of PSM and 
fail to disclose important design choices, suggesting widespread misunderstanding about the 
econometric issues that PSM addresses. For example, PSM addresses endogeneity concerns 
related to functional form misspecifications but does not address most endogeneity concerns 
related to self-selection or to omitted variables. Shipman et al. offer suggestions for more 
convincing implementations of PSM such as using PSM and multivariate regression in 
combination.  
Bowen, Frésard and Taillard (2016) show that identification articles attract 22% more 
citations than matched nonidentification articles, and point to a secular rise in identification 
technology in the field of corporate finance and governance. Atanasov and Black (2016) 
indicate that shocks (i.e., natural experiments or quasi-experiments) provide a stronger basis 
for causal inference, and shock-based papers on corporate governance have roughly twice as 
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many downloads per paper as non-shock based papers on Social Science Research Network. 
Regulatory changes on corporate governance rules in emerging countries provide useful shocks 
that can be used as identification strategies. Atanasov and Black (2016) provide guidance on 
how to improve shock-based causal inference, even if inference remains imperfect. In using 
shock-based instrumental variables, for example, the covariate balance between treatment 
group and control group needs to be shown.  
To resume, quantitative studies need to carefully choose suitable research designs based 
on the nature of any potential endogeneity concerns. Of course, possible endogeneity is only 
one type of challenge in empirical research, albeit one that has attracted increasing attention. 
In the area of corporate governance, there are also many questions about which qualitative 
methods will continue to yield insights (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas, 2013). More specifically, 
qualitative research methods may provide much potential to better illuminate the determinants, 
patterns and consequences of the aforementioned peculiarities of corporate governance in 
emerging economies.  
 
Research Contributions in the Special Issue 
This special issue of the Corporate Governance: An International Review is aimed at 
presenting high quality work on the governance issues and solutions that are characteristic of 
emerging economies as outlined above. The four articles included in this issue are developed 
from multiple disciplines engaged in corporate governance research, address different aspects 
of governance problems in emerging markets, employ diverse theories to guide their studies, 
and cover various governance environments (in single- as well as multi-country settings).  
In the first article entitled “An institutional perspective on corruption in transition 
economies”, Alon and Hageman (in this issue) analyse the level of unofficial payments for tax 
purposes in 21 transition economies of the former Soviet bloc. They document a negative 
11 
 
relation between unofficial payments and rule-based trust measured by rule of law, but a 
positive relation with dispositional trust, which facilitates the exchange in resources. Since 
legal institutions are not well developed in Soviet bloc countries, informal institutions (such as 
trust-based informal networks) play an important role. In these countries, businesses are put in 
a position where bribes are expected in order to receive services and speed up bureaucratic 
procedures. The discussion is in line with the findings in Mironov (2015) that corrupt managers 
in Russia advance shareholder interests through avoiding paying taxes, obtaining government 
contracts, removing business impediments by paying bribes, and manoeuvring around bad 
laws. 
CEO turnover and CEO compensation are frequently addressed subjects of corporate 
governance that have been widely studied in the context of emerging economies (Chen, 
Cumming, Hou & Lee, 2016; Conyon & He, 2014; González, Guzmán, Pombo & Trujillo, 
2015; Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi & White, 2005; Pessarossi, P., & Weill, L. 2013; as well 
as Chizema, Liu, Lu & Gao, 2015; Gallego & Larrain, 2012; Ghosh, 2006; Peng, Sun & 
Matkóczy, 2015). Prior research has mainly scrutinized the determinants of CEO turnover (e.g., 
Aivazian, Ge & Qiu, 2005; Cao, Pan, Qian & Tian, 2017; Fan, Lau & Young, 2007; Tsai, Kuo 
& Hung, 2009) as well as the performance effects and sensitivity of various arrangements of 
CEO compensation (Conyon & He, 2012; Firth, Fung & Rui, 2006; Mengistae & Xu, 2004). 
He, Shaw and Fang (in this issue) analyse the relationship between CEO compensation and 
voluntary CEO turnover. To better illuminate this complex relationship, they consider 
important institutional moderators, namely labour-market transparency, mobility and 
competitiveness, and show how these contingencies shape the supply and demand conditions 
of the managerial labour market. Based on institutional theory, organizational psychology 
(most notably equity theory) and labour economics, their article indicates how the institutional 
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environment and labour market characteristics tend to link pull-side and push-side drivers of 
CEO turnover within an emerging economy. 
For a sample of 1,409 Chinese listed firms covering the years 2002 to 2011 and 
including 2,137 different CEOs, the authors demonstrate that underpayment of the CEO tends 
to increase the likelihood of voluntary turnover. More intriguingly, they also show that this 
effect tends to be more pronounced when the labour market is more transparent (due to 
mandatory compensation disclosure rules), labour-market mobility is higher in the region 
where the firm is headquartered, and the labour market is less competitive (due to higher growth 
rates within the industry). These findings shed new light on the effects of the managerial labour 
market on CEO turnover decisions during institutional transition. The findings also inform 
practitioners regarding the design of CEO compensation design that can motivate able CEOs 
to remain in office, and that may differ with conditions in the managerial labour market. 
Sun, Yuan, Cao and Wang (in this issue) study the impact of reform of the split-share 
structure in China on the risk of a stock-price crash. The reform terminated the trading 
constraints on restricted shares of listed firms in China, which were largely held by state 
shareholders. It aligns the interests between dominant state shareholders and private minority 
shareholders, which in turn decreases their conflict of interest with private minority 
shareholders, and reduces the risk of a stock-price crash. The findings add to studies of this 
arguably most significant leap in the Chinese capital market, which has been found to increase 
stock informativeness (Hou, Kuo & Lee 2012), turnover-to-performance sensitivity (Chen, 
Cumming, Hou & Lee, 2016), and both output and profit (Liao, Liu & Wang, 2014). 
In the fourth paper entitled “Buying gold at the price of silver? Controlling shareholders 
and real estate transactions in Korean listed firms”, Yang (in this issue) studies controlling 
shareholders in Korea. Many firms are controlled by families but not wholly owned by them: 
the rights to cash flows from the firm are less, often much less, than the rights to control the 
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firm. This structure gives the controlling shareholder an incentive, and the power, to direct their 
firm to conduct transactions whereby the firm loses and the shareholder or their family interests 
gain. Since the loss to the firm is shared with the non-controlling shareholders, the family 
makes a net gain. This tunnelling behaviour is believed to be widely practised. For example, 
Enriques and Volpin (2007) believe that ‘minor forms of expropriation are systemic in 
continental Europe’ (p. 124). However, because tunnelling is a clandestine activity, evidence 
on its extent and nature can be hard to come by. 
 Yang’s paper exploits data on land prices in Korea that are reviewed annually by the 
Korean Ministry of Land, whether or not the land has been traded. He identifies a sample of 
real estate transactions between a listed firm and the controlling shareholder, and calculates the 
returns, using the officially assessed prices of the relevant property, over three years before the 
transaction, and over three years after. He documents that, for sales from shareholder to firm, 
the average return before the sale exceeds the average return after, while for sales from 
shareholder to firm, the reverse is the case. The inference is that controlling shareholders are 
able to obtain a favourable price compared with a fair arm’s length price, and/or are consistently 
able to time the transaction, possibly using private information, so that sales (purchases) are 
made after large (before) price rises. The loss on average to the firm, estimated from a restricted 
sample where the transaction price is available, is 26% of the firm’s operating profit in the 
relevant year. The paper provides unusually clear and direct evidence of one type of tunnelling 
behaviour, and the gains that are made from it. 
The four articles included in this special issue will hopefully stimulate further research 
on corporate governance challenges in emerging economies. They offer new insights and 
provide promising avenues to advance our wisdom on governance peculiarities in developing 
countries. These peculiarities may encourage new theoretical lenses and approaches as extant 
theories developed for established economies may inadequately account for the diversity of 
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various markets (Marquis & Raynard, 2015) and insufficiently fit the governance environments 
faced by firms in emerging economies (cf. Barkema, Chen, George, Luo & Tsui, 2015). These 
theories may also benefit from a more comprehensive inclusion of the context and particularly 
the institutional environment in which firms and their governance are embedded (cf. 
Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima, 2013; George, 2015; Meyer & Peng, 2016).  
 
Conclusion 
Governance problems and firm-level governance are embedded in country-specific national 
business systems, and influenced by political, social and legal macro-institutions. Depending 
on these environmental characteristics, governance solutions and their eligibility can vary 
widely across countries and particularly between established and emerging economies. The 
present special issue addresses important challenges of corporate governance in emerging 
market economies. Due to the peculiarities of these economies, that differ substantially from 
the much-more-widely-studied established economies, further research remains essential in 
order to advance our wisdom about corporate governance in developing countries and to inform 
practitioners and rule-makers about the antecedents and effects of various governance 
arrangements. We hope that the contributions included in this special issue will inspire and 
motivate researchers to continue to conduct research in this field so that some of the research 
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